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Growing China’s renewables sector: a developmental state approach 
Geoffrey C. Chen (University of Duisburg-Essen) and Charles Lees (University 
of Bath) 
 
Abstract 
Over the last decade China expanded its renewable energy sector with 
unprecedented speed. This success story presents a challenge to Western 
modes of environmental governance, where stakeholder participation is often 
deemed a necessary pre-condition for effective policy outcomes. Drawing on 
new research including previously unpublished interview data, the article first 
discusses established modes of environmental governance before examining 
the growth of China’s renewables sector through the theoretical lens of the 
‘developmental state’. The article then analyses renewable energy policy 
design and implementation in China, illustrating how top-down command and 
control strategies have successfully diffused renewable energy technology 
from a standing start. We argue that (1) China’s distinct approach to the 
sector differs from Western modes of environmental governance and (2) this 
has revealed a new path towards renewable energy diffusion that 
authoritarian states in particular might regard as an attractive alternative to 
participatory models. 
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Introduction 
 
Mitigating climate change entails reshaping the energy sector, accelerating 
technological innovation, and raising public awareness. The task also 
requires substantial political capital to implement long-term mitigation 
strategies. In many Western democracies, political support is built on a 
decision-making process in which widening public participation is assumed 
to be desirable or even non-negotiable (O’Riordan and Jäger 1996; OECD 
2002; Van Tatenhove and Leroy 2003; Few et al. 2007; Baker 2013; Devine-
Wright 2014). Western modes of environmental governance are by no means 
identical but generally entail a degree of recognition that central government 
should cede power to sub-national tiers of government and work in 
partnership with non-governmental actors (WECD 1987; Mol 1996; Seyfang 
and Haxeltine 2012; Bäckstrand and Kylsäter 2014). Taken in the round they 
constitute an orthodox dominant policy template adopted by many states 
(Hajer 2010; Wanner 2015). 
 
As the Figure below indicates, China’s renewable energy industry grew at 
unprecedented speed and surpassed previously leading countries (Bradsher 
2010; REN21 2015: 20). The approach China settled upon after some trial 
and error, however, is driven by top-down command and control measures 
(Schreurs 2011). This makes China an important outlier and potential 
alternative pole of influence in the context of global environmental politics. 
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Insert Figure about here 
 
This article explores how China developed its relatively unorthodox model for 
swiftly diffusing non-hydro renewable energy. Next we posit our definitions 
and conceptualisation, including a brief description of the sustainable 
development ideal type, the national modes of governance that it informs, as 
well as the broad principles of the developmental state model. Following that 
we examine the application of the developmental state model in Chinai. 
Finally we discuss how the Chinese model provides an attractive alternative 
for authoritarian states. 
 
 
Definitions and Conceptualisation  
 
Our analysis recognises that the modes of governance that emerged in the 
Chinese renewables sector were contingent on context and circumstance. 
The Europeanisation literature demonstrates that institutional consolidation 
and change is non-linear (Radaelli 2005) and marked by a ‘complex causality’ 
(Saurugger 2006). From a different theoretical tradition but also focusing on 
European governance, Jessop’s ‘strategic-relational’ approach stresses the 
dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship between ‘modes’ and 
‘objects’ of governance (Jessop 2005). As we shall see, in developing its 
renewables sector Chinese policy makers rejected established Western 
modes of environmental governance – although specific practices were 
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adapted where necessary. But neither did China revert to its default pattern 
of decentralised governance but rather we see the emergence of a ‘definite 
mode’ of governance (Jessop 1997) appropriate to the specificities of 
renewables sector in China and the political-economic role it plays. 
 
China’s adoption of a developmental state strategy was no foregone 
conclusion. Yeh and Lewis (2004) argue that China originally pursued a more 
market-oriented path but modified it because of internal and external 
pressures. For instance, whilst it soon became clear that power supplies 
could not keep up with the pace of industrial development, concerns for 
energy security meant the Chinese government remained ‘cautious about 
allowing foreign companies to gain control of electricity production’ (Yeh and 
Lewis 2004: 448). China felt the need to partially acquiesce to World Bank 
pressure to privatise the sector in order to attract capital investment but 
remained wary of the dangers of market failure. In particular, the California 
electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001 convinced China's leaders that ‘the only 
way to maintain system reliability is to maintain government control’ (Yeh and 
Lewis 2004: 450). And of course the Chinese Communist Party had observed 
the Perestroika reforms and the Soviet Union’s subsequent collapse and had 
drawn the appropriate conclusions. Under the principle of ‘grasping the large 
and releasing the small’ in order to maintain overall political-economic 
control, Chinese policy makers settled on the retention of so-called ‘Pillar 
Industries’ whilst gradually liberalising relatively small and medium-sized 
state owned enterprises (Pearson 2015). 
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Sustainable development and multi-level governance as the Western 
orthodoxy 
There is no single ‘Western’ mode of environmental governance but there are 
commonalities across Western jurisdictions that are not seen in the Chinese 
context. Many of these are grounded in the assumptions that underpin the 
notion of sustainable development, which has become a significant 
normative and technical guide for environmental governance. The discourse 
of sustainable development was deployed in the 1980 World Conservation 
Strategy (IUCN; UNEP; WWF) but is most commonly associated with the 
‘Brundtland Report’ (WCED 1987). These principles informed the Rio Earth 
Summit (UNCED 1992 Agenda 21) and in subsequent documents from 
international organisations such as the World Bank’s Global Environmental 
Facility and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
 
The pragmatic, reformist, and anthropocentric principles of sustainable 
development work with the grain of orthodox political economy, particularly 
since the neo-liberal turn, and have gained much traction. The core elements 
are: (1) development, with a focus on meeting basic human needs and 
achieving more equitable living standards; (2) sustainability, with an emphasis 
on greater inter-generational justice; (3) equity, encouraging sustainable and 
socially responsible patterns of consumption; and (4) integration, planning, 
and democratic participation. Three additional features underpin these four 
elements. First, the precautionary principle, which has generated robust risk 
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management practices and, embedded in the environmental Aquis, is now a 
statutory requirement for EU member states and candidate states. Second, a 
distinct set of institutional forms and practices, particularly in member states, 
including integrated Ministries of the Environment, autonomous stand-alone 
Environment Agencies, inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral/horizontal and 
vertical policy integration, and policy instruments. Third, through Agenda 21, 
a commitment to broadening and deepening networks to encompass 
activists and policy entrepreneurs in a web of multi-level governance and 
resource dependence. 
 
The EU is an active proponent of this approach, working through multiple 
institutional actors including the Commission (DG ENV, the Industry and 
Agriculture DGs and, in the case of accession states, DG Enlargement), the 
European Parliament, and to a lesser extent the Council of Ministers, 
European Council, and European Court of Justice. Environmental action 
plans develop distinctive policy instruments including a Community Action 
Program promoting NGOs in the environmental field, voluntary agreements 
such as the Eco-label scheme, and the cultivation of formal and informal 
expert networks reaching across and beyond the EU (Taylor et al. 2012). 
 
Within this overall framework, variance remains across individual states and 
across sectors. Sectoral variance is well documented (Cowell et al. 2015), 
recognising that institutions of governance should as far as possible reflect 
the scale of the problems associated with each sector (Bulkeley, Watson, 
	 7	
and Hudson 2007; Watson et al. 2008; Moss and Newig 2010). Studies of 
national variance are less common and research into energy transitions tend 
to favour single states (Nadai 2007; Wolfe 2008; Klagge and Brocke 2012) or 
focussed comparisons between states (Toke and Lauber 2007; Lehtonen and 
Nye 2009). More comparative research is needed, particularly into how the 
complex task of aligning regulatory, market, and social interventions is 
achieved across different settings. But the limited comparative research 
indicates that we should not be surprised by the persistence of variance at 
the national level, despite pressures from the European level (Taylor et al. 
2012). 
 
Nevertheless European states face common problems in the promotion and 
governance of renewable energy, particularly the need to foster innovation, 
cement public acceptance and political support, and secure economic 
resources (Elliott 2011; Jänicke 2012a, 2012b; Warren et al. 2012). Because 
publics often associate renewable energy with noise pollution, economic 
damage, and some deterioration of the landscape, renewable energy 
projects in the West are regularly opposed by local residents (Rule 2014), 
which further sharpens the focus on the need to secure stakeholder 
engagement (Devine-Wright 2014)ii. As we shall see, these concerns are less 
evident in China. 
 
The developmental state 
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Environmental scholars have begun to question whether decentralisation is 
conducive to achieving step changes of policy and governance (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2007) and doubts have emerged about the quality of evidence 
demonstrating that participatory governance works as a universal template 
(Midlarsky 1998; Blühdorn 2013). The progress made by China in the 
renewables sector over a very short period of time has amplified these 
concerns. 
 
Our reading of the existing literature (Amsden 2004; Wade 2004; Cumings 
2005; Breslin 2012; Johnson 2012; Gore 2014) and our own research leads 
us to argue that China’s approach to governance of the renewables sector 
conforms to the developmental state model. The developmental state 
literature draws upon historical examples from Europe, such as 16th century 
England or 19th century Germany, as well as the experiences of the post-war 
East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
 
Evidence from East Asia in particular demonstrates how political elites went 
above and beyond the simple exploitation of short-term comparative 
advantage in order to transcend their branch economy status within the 
global economic system (Öniş 1991: 110; Evans 2014). The primary objective 
was modernisation and the market made subservient to the need to ‘catch 
up’ with the developed economies. The developmental state literature 
explicitly links state intervention and rapid economic development (Woo-
Cumings 1999: 2; Kjær 2004: 133). 
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The literature, however, goes beyond a simple focus on state intervention. 
Weiss identifies three dimensions along which we can map the 
developmental state. These are, first, their strategic priorities, second, their 
organisational arrangements, and, third, the extent of institutionalised links 
between the state and organised economic actors (Weiss 2000: 23). In terms 
of the first dimension, East Asian states were not interested in exploiting a 
stable but subaltern position within the global economic system but rather 
were determined to catch up. Second, in terms of organisational 
arrangements, market activity is guided by a lead industrial planning agency. 
This institution attracts the best managerial talent, who are delegated and 
supported by political elites within a hierarchical political system. Third, the 
paradigmatic developmental state intervenes through leveraging tight 
government-corporate networks, which are the conduit for information flows. 
These three dimensions explain why policy makers overseeing economic 
development enjoy a degree of operational autonomy not seen elsewhere 
(Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005). Buttressed by political elites but also 
endowed with a high degree of popular legitimacy, technocrats within the 
developmental state avoid the experiences of their contemporaries in weaker 
states, where private and/or short-term interests often subvert the 
modernisation process (Öniş 1991: 114; Evans 2014). In developmental 
states there is a high level of consensus over national development goals and 
support for the economic bureaucracy to take effective policy measures to 
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achieve the catch-up that is at the core of developmental state strategy 
(Weiss 2003: 247). 
 
Thus the developmental state is reflexive. Elites are aware of their relative 
backwardness and governments deploy techno-managerial policy networks 
to overcome this. These arrangements are fundamentally different from many 
of the newly industrialised states in Latin America, where the economic 
bureaucracy exercises limited competence (Weiss 2004: 49–54). In 
developmental states, pilot agencies regularly announce development plans 
with particular targets set. Governments also establish a range of positive 
and negative incentives to shape behaviour in selected sectors to achieve 
catch-up (Johnson 1987: 142; Wade 2004). Private sector actors then adjust 
their expectations and subsequent operations based on these incentives. 
One of the key incentives deployed are subsidies based on performance. 
Technocrats give or sustain support for particular enterprises and sanction 
underperforming businesses (Amsden 2004). In the developmental state, 
‘intervention was more performance-oriented and targeted than in Western 
countries’ (Kjær 2004: 135). When permitted, European states might allocate 
‘bailout’ funds to support precarious industrial sectors (Weiss and Hobson 
2007: 151; Yeung 2014). In developmental states, by contrast, the 
government picks winners: strategically sponsoring sectors, cultivating 
competitiveness and leadership in domestic or international markets, 
research, and exports, but also protecting local businesses (Wong 2004: 350; 
Breslin 2012).  
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The developmental state drives economic policy forward through a range of 
financial interventions. State-owned banks monitor capital flows and policy 
makers develop regulations for limiting such flows and as well as controlling 
prices (Wade 2004; Johnson 2012). Science and technology policy is central 
to the modernisation process and technology transfer is pursued through 
licensing from abroad (Amsden 2004; Evans 2014). Governments also invest 
in training technology professionals and developing human capital. Crucially, 
however, the developmental state sees no matching obligation to its citizens’ 
wider welfare needs (Öniş 1991: 113; Johnson 2012). 
 
It is easy to see why developmental states tend to emerge within 
authoritarian regimes. Such regimes allow coordination to take place and, in 
turn, the successful modernisation of the economy maintains political 
stability and boosts system legitimacy. Chalmers Johnson (1987) describes 
how political systems often differ across developmental states but, when 
encountering endogenous and exogenous challenges, all of these countries 
have kept citizen participation in check.  
 
Compared with liberal democratic states, the acid test of the developmental 
state is the reification of economic development as a system output. Built 
upon resource scarcity, industrial programs in developmental states are both 
economically nationalist and oriented towards the global economy. Thus, on 
the one hand, developmental states limit the influence of foreign capital in 
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order to protect emerging industries and, on the other, they develop a range 
of institutional configurations aimed at nurturing future competitiveness in 
international markets and building national champions (Yeung 2014). The 
high levels of legitimacy enjoyed by East Asian states as a result has to some 
extent allowed them to avoid the crises seen in newly industrialised countries 
in Latin America, including Argentina and Brazil, when enacting supply-side 
measures and seeking the cooperation of organised business groups (Öniş 
1991: 118). 
 
 
The Developmental State in the Chinese context: a Chinese alternative? 
 
The logic of the developmental state is apparent in the Chinese strategy of 
catch up within the renewables sector, with concerted attempts to transfer 
and adapt the best available foreign technology, whilst actively protecting 
China’s domestic industry (Pearson 2005). Governance of the sector remains 
firmly in the hands of the state, with the majority of energy producers and 
grid networks dominated by state-owned enterprises (Andrews-Speed 2012; 
Pearson 2015), albeit with an increasing number of local private sector actors 
involved in wind turbine and photovoltaic technologies.  
 
The domestic sector was incentivised by localised protection measures. 
Before 2009, for instance, all tenders for wind power construction projects had 
to meet a localisation rate (the percentage of equipment produced 
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domestically) of 70 per cent (Lewis 2013: 82). Such measures encouraged 
domestic manufacturers to close the technology gap with market leaders 
rather than rely on labour-intensive comparative advantage. Technology 
transfer took place through licencing purchases or by acquiring intellectual 
property rights (Lewis 2011, 2013). For example, Goldwind, a state-owned 
enterprise now ranked in the world’s top five wind power equipment 
manufacturers, purchased technology licences from German manufacturers 
Jacobs, RE Powers, and Vensys. Similarly, Ming Yang, China’s largest 
private-sector wind power equipment manufacturers, obtained technology 
licences from another German company, the turbine manufacturer Aerodyniii 
In this fashion domestic enterprises moved quickly up the technological 
ladder, won local market share and, as the sector matured, strengthened 
global competitiveness. 
 
In addition – and again consistent with developmental state paradigm - China 
tasked a lead agency, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) to develop the sectoriv. The NDRC strictly controlled the price of 
electricity generated from renewable sourcesv, an approach fundamentally 
contrary to the neo-liberal doctrine that, in order to stimulate the sector, the 
appropriate course of action is to progressively lift restrictions and embed 
comparative advantage (Kuzemko 2013). Through the NDRC, which enjoyed 
far great steering power than a European-style environment ministry or 
environmental protection agency, China was able to actively intervene in the 
market by re-allocating resources and controlling energy prices. 
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These measures were not old-school Maoism, however (García 2011). The 
role of the state transformed from that of an administrative executive to that 
of an entrepreneurial agency by, first, incentivising companies to align 
themselves with the wider industrial plan and, second, allocating resources 
within the power generation sector and coordinating the activities of public- 
and private-sector manufacturers. The intention was to discipline these firms 
to provide the backbone of the Pillar Industry and drive economic 
development. 
 
Following the introduction of the Renewable Energy Law in 2006, the State 
Council published a number of related policy documents, including Trial 
Measures for Pricing and Cost Sharing Management for Renewable Energy 
Power (2006), the Opinions of the State Council of Invigorating Equipment 
Manufacturing (2006), the Middle- and Long-Term Programme of Renewable 
Energy Development (2007), the “Eleventh Five-Year” Guidelines for 
Renewable Energy Development (2008), the Notice on Policy to Improve 
Grid-Connected Power Pricing for Wind Power (2009), and the Decision on 
Accelerating the Fostering and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries 
(2010). All of these documents confirm the role of the NDRC as the focal point 
for guiding and incentivising the sector. As Andy Zhong, the marketing 
director of the China Sunergy Co. Ltd., a Chinese enterprise listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange, indicated: ‘learning has been important for us, and the 
policy documents provided by the government have become the most 
important sources!’vi 
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The Chinese state deploys negative incentives as well and large state-owned 
enterprises in particular are tasked with acquiring mandatory market share 
with potential sanctions for failure. The NDRC’s 2007 Middle- and Long-Term 
Program of Renewable Energy Development document stated: ‘electricity 
producers with more than 5 million kW of their total installed capacity should 
produce 3 per cent and 8 per cent of electricity generated from non-hydro 
renewable sources, respectively’ (NDRC 2007: 30). As Hongfei Huang, 
manager of offshore wind power development for state-owned enterprise 
Zhejiang Energy Corporation, observed, this compelled state-owned 
enterprises to participate in the rush to wind power.vii Similarly, Yangang Jia, 
the vice president of China Electric Equipment Group (GEEG) and the 
president of Solar Energy Research Institute, said wryly,  
This is what we called ‘listen to the Party, lean on a moneybags, 
find the right path’ (Tingdangdehua, bangdakuan, zouzhenglu, 听党
的 ，傍大款，走正路). There is no other way, as the NDRC is 
where industry policies are issued…... So we have no choice but to 
build a smooth relationship with central government’ (Jia 2013)viii.  
 
 
Building an internationally competitive renewables sector from the top 
down 
 
The early stages of China’s development policy were built on carbon energy, 
and in particular its enormous coal reserves, with huge negative 
environmental impacts (Liu and Diamond 2005; Shapiro 2012). By the late 
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1990s, the environmental damage inflicted was hard to ignore. Over the 
following decade the pollution problem became increasingly intractable, in 
that the downside risk of slowing economic growth was potentially as 
damaging as maintaining the existing carbon-intensive modernisation path. 
Squaring this circle was key to why the shape of China’s renewable energy 
policy was fundamentally different from those of the European environmental 
leaders.  
 
The biggest difference is in the nature of business ownership in China. As we 
have discussed, China focused on deploying state-owned enterprises as the 
gatekeepers of energy security. In particular, two state corporations, the 
China Southern Power Grid Company Limited and the State Grid Corporation 
of China, dominated the power transmission, transformation and distribution 
markets. Unlike in Western economies where the renewables orthodoxy 
emerged, China’s energy market was tightly controlled and the Communist 
Party, through its formal bureaucracy and its penetration of institutions and 
civil society, actively shaped business investment decisions (Tunsjø 2013). 
One interviewee remarked: ‘China’s renewable energy development seems to 
be dominated by large companies, most of which have official colours’ix.  
 
The second feature in which China differed from most Western countries is 
that state-owned enterprises also dominated the scaling up of the power 
generation sectorx and private power companies only accounted for a limited 
market share (Xu 2010; Wang et al. 2012). As gate keepers within the sector, 
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large state-owned enterprises securitised the energy resources involved – an 
outcome considered as much a priority as creating a profitable sector. Again 
this contrasts to the broadly market-oriented thinking of energy governance 
in the West, in which market efficiency is often the desired outcome. 
 
So the Chinese energy market is dominated by the state. But as has always 
been the case in a country as vast and diverse as China, central government 
delegates functional responsibility to the provinces, mandating them to 
introduce the appropriate policies for local conditions, subject to central 
guidance (Yindi zhiyi, 因地制宜). This means that local governments enjoy 
some discretion in adapting central government’s mandate to local conditions. 
For example, when adapting central government’s unified tariff policy, Jiangsu 
Province, in which a number of successful equipment manufacturers were 
located, added additional subsidies to facilitate the development of local 
energy suppliers. By contrast, Zhejiang Province - another province with a 
reputation for cultivating entrepreneurship – chose to implement central 
government policy without any additional augmentationxi. In general, however, 
the consensus remains amongst provincial policy makers that the provinces 
should restrict themselves to an ‘assistant’s role’xii and work with the grain of 
central government policy. As an anonymous senior official at the Provincial 
Development and Reform Commission commented: ‘central government is 
the most important actor, whose mandates are to be obeyed in every way, 
and the province’s responsibility is to add some other features and facilitate 
the implementation of the policy’xiii.  
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There are two reasons why the Chinese central state remains capable of 
such control. First, as one of our interviewees pointed out, ‘central 
government has official capacity and is capable of taking funds from the 
provinces and then redistributing them to lower levels of governments to fulfil 
tasks allocated by the centre. In addition to centrally distributed funds, local 
governments can also facilitate additional development funding to assist in 
the implementation of policy’xiv. Article 3 of the 2006 version of the Interim 
Measures for the Special Fund Management for the Development of 
Renewable Energy specifies that these development funds should be used 
primarily for research and development, standardisation, application 
programmes, system construction, resource exploration and – crucial to 
China’s developmental state approach - to promote local equipment 
productionxv. In the solar sector, the most critical policy measures introduced 
by central government were the Solar Photovoltaic Building Demonstration 
Scheme (Taiyangneng guangdian jianzhu yingyong shifan xiangmu, 太阳能光
 建筑 用示范 目) and the Golden Sun Demonstration Scheme (Jintaiyang 
shifan goncheng xiangmu, 金太阳示范工程 目). These two schemes were 
intended to more efficiently allocate funds to support the rapid expansion of 
solar power installation. Wind power, on the other hand, was expanded 
through large-scale auctioning mechanisms. Power suppliers and equipment 
manufacturers collaborated in bidding processes and state-owned power 
transmission and distribution companies were required to sign agreements 
with them to carry out constructionxvi. 
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The second reason, as indicated by one of our interviewees, is that central 
government, through the NDRC, still enjoys more leverage over the relevant 
policy instruments than local government. In China a mechanism called 
‘hook responsibility’ (Guagou zeren, 挂  任) delegates responsibility and 
liability downwards from central to provincial to municipal governments and 
then, eventually, to township governments. As an interviewee noted: ‘if a 
problem occurs after policy implementation, the centre will blame the 
subordinate in charge’xvii. Hook responsibility helps central government limit 
ex post opportunism and ensure that the provinces effectively implement 
mandated policies. As another interviewee told us: ‘only central government 
is entitled to introduce key measures regarding tariff and tax policies, and 
only the central government has the final say on these issues.’xviii  
 
We can see how hook responsibility operates in the area of solar energy, 
where in 2010 the Ministry of Finance issued the Notice of the Organisation 
of Solar Photovoltaic Building Demonstration Project, under which solar 
photovoltaic building integration projects received unified support through 
two sets of price subsidiesxix (Wang et al. 2012: 80). In the same year, central 
government also introduced the so-called Golden Sun Scheme, with the aim 
of scaling up a photovoltaic industry that was henceforth to be regarded as 
one of China’s ‘strategic emerging industries’ (Zhanlue xinxing chanye,  略
新   ). The policy regulated equipment for the tender, subsidy standards, 
supervision, and management of energy projects. 50 per cent of price 
subsidies were provided through a unified bidding process for demonstration 
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projects using crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules, grid-connected 
inverters, and lead-acid batteries (Wang et al. 2012: 81). As discussed earlier, 
this ‘unified’ pricing policy left little local discretion within the top-down chain 
of command between central government, the provinces, and local 
government. 
 
China’s development state approach is not just limited to top-down command 
and control measures. For instance, the early development of the photovoltaic 
equipment manufacturing industry took place in a relatively decentralised 
fashion where, as Gallager points out (2014: 222–4) local manufacturing was 
boosted by individual technical and academic experts, especially those 
returned from overseas with knowledge of modern climate technology. A 
number of private, local solar and wind power equipment manufacturers 
rapidly emerged with government supportxx, such as the Chinese Electric 
Equipment Group for solar energy and Ming Yang for wind power sector – 
although state-owned enterprises such as Goldwind continued to dominate 
market share (Lewis 2013: 161–2). Development of the sector was boosted 
by cultivated interaction between state, academia and industry in the kind of 
corporatist networks we associate with the developmental state paradigm. 
One of our interviewees indicated that, as the lead agency for the sector, the 
NDRC closely cooperated with the China Association for Science and 
Technology. Moreover, in Jiangsu Province the provincial Energy Research 
Society took responsibility for the development and execution of technology 
projects and also drafted the Eleventh and Twelve Five-Year strategies for 
energy conservation for the Jiangsu Provincial government. As our 
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interviewee observed: ‘in the last fifteen years, under Premier Li’s 
encouragement, civil society has taken on more and more of the duties 
assigned by the government’xxi. The harnessing of all levels of government 
and civil society was also advocated in the 2006 Opinions of the State Council 
for Invigorating Equipment Manufacturing, to mobilise educational institutions 
to build human capital and also to facilitate catch-up in key technologies and 
equipment (Article 3.4–3.9). Again this is consistent with the developmental 
state’s emphasises on the significance of human capital for modernisation. 	
It is clear that, after a period of trial and error, the Chinese communist party 
now considers the developmental state paradigm the appropriate model, 
given the trade-off between the need to cultivate quasi-market dynamics 
whilst retaining central steering capacity. This pattern is somewhat at odds 
with the energy sector as a whole, in which a more decentralised model is the 
norm (Andrews-Speed 2012) and might reflect the relative failure of some 
aspects of China’s modernisation process where central control has been less 
apparentxxii . This supports Jessop’s notion of the constitutive and evolving 
relationship between ‘modes’ and ‘objects’ of governance (Jessop 2005). 
The defining feature of China’s renewables governance is the degree to which 
the main parameters, including how tariffs are set, the degree to which local 
government can adapt central government policy, etc., are determined by the 
NDRC. Consistent with the developmental paradigm, the NDRC has 
considerable operational autonomy, framing the renewables sector as a 
‘strategic’ modern Pillar Industry, levering corporate networks, and rapidly 
growing China’s installed capacity of renewable energy, as well as overseeing 
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the expansion of the global market share in equipment manufacturing. The 
sector has been guided by a centralised, and professionalised leadership 
with the goal of upgrading the sector in order to catch up with and eventually 
overtake advanced Western states. Such a strategy was ultimately driven by 
the imperative of state building rather than environmental protection. But in 
doing so it has nevertheless overseen the expansion of the Chinese 
renewables industry from a standing start to world-class status. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article shows how the rapid expansion of the renewables sector in China 
and the associated scaling-up process have not followed the sustainable 
development paradigm that we see in different forms in the West, 
characterised by varying degrees of participatory governance, 
decentralisation, and the inclusion of societal actors.  
 
On the contrary, this study demonstrates that the expansion of renewable 
energy in China was characterised by the enhancement of central steering 
capacity, consistent with the developmental state paradigm. In the Chinese 
model, neither market efficiency nor increasing societal participation was a 
priority for restructuring the energy market. Instead, central government 
securitised the sector through re-centralisation and re-intervention, giving 
priority to political stability through its lead agency, the NDRC.  
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This article demonstrates that the emerging model of renewable energy 
governance in China re-emphasises what many environmental governance 
theorists have regarded as a thing of the past: top-down command and 
control policy instruments levered by a strong state. China will not give up its 
bureaucratic system-monitoring mechanisms and remains actively involved 
in the developmental process. It has created a ‘definite mode’ of governance 
(Jessop 1997) that is appropriate to the sector in China and the role it plays 
in political-economic terms as a Pillar Industry. The apparent success of this 
strategy poses a challenge to Western modes of governance as it provides 
an attractive alternative for authoritarian states elsewhere in the world that 
may wish to address their environmental problems but do not wish to cede 
political or economic control in order to do so. 
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Figure: Cumulative installed wind power capacity in the top ten 
countries, 1980-2013 (Megawatts) 
 
Source: http://www.earth-policy.org/? /data_center/C23/, accessed 4 May 
2014. Adapted by authors. 
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End-notes 
																																								 																				i	Our	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 data	 from	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 32	 renewable	 energy-related	 policymakers,	 think	 tanks,	 academic	 researchers,	 business	 practitioners,	 and	nongovernmental	 organisations	 conducted	 during	 the	 field	 trip	 from	 9	 February	 to	 25	 August	2013.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 interviewees	 are	 leaders	 or	 senior	 executives	 in	 professional	associations,	research	societies,	academic	institutions,	corporations,	government	apparatus,	and	non-profit	 organisations.	 Apart	 from	 interview	data,	 our	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 collected	written	materials,	 including	 policy	 and	 legislature	 documents,	 statistical	 data,	 newspaper	 articles,	 and	limited	availability	of	internal	documents.	ii	Evidence	drawn	 from	Germany	and	Denmark’s	 experience	 seems	 to	 show	 that	 the	 sharing	of	decentralised	ownership	rights	reduces	local	objections	to	the	deployment	of	renewable	energy	(Jacobsson	and	Lauber	2006;	Mitchell	et	al.	2006;	Szarka	and	Blühdorn	2006;	Elliott	2011:	219–48)	 and	 outcomes	 tend	 to	 be	 better	 if	 residents	 have	 an	 economic	 interest	 in	 local	 projects	(Mabee	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Moreover,	 ceteris	 paribus	 large-scale	 developments	 seem	 to	 be	 less	acceptable	 to	 public	 opinion	 than	 a	 proliferation	 of	 small,	 privately	 administered	 projects	(Devine-Wright	2014).	iii	Other	 examples	 are	 Sinovel	 and	Dongfang.	 These	 two	domestic	 companies	 remain	 in	 the	 top	three.	 They	 acquire	 technology	 licences	 from	 Fuhrländer	 and	 RE	 Power,	 both	 of	 which	 are	German	turbine	companies	(Lewis	2011:	294).	iv	As	 a	 successor	 to	 the	 State	 Planning	 Commission	 that	 maintained	 control	 of	 the	 country’s	planned	 economy,	 NDRC	 is	 a	 restructured	 governmental	 organisation	 under	 the	 State	 Council,	which	maintains	obligation	 to	 formulate	macroeconomic	policies	and	social	development.	With	respect	 to	 energy	 governance,	 one	 of	 the	 agency’s	 functions	 is	 to	 determine	 the	 general	framework	of	the	country’s	energy	policies	and	to	permit	major	development	projects.	Even	more	so,	 NDRC	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 the	 planning	 and	 drafting	 of	 climate	 policies;	 its	 subsidiary	apparatus,	the	Department	of	Climate	Change,	is	responsible	for	'front	end'	climate	actions	such	as	carbon	emissions	trading,	controlling	the	greenhouse	gases	emitted	by	the	heavy	industry	and	project	 approval.	 Its	 power	 seems	 stronger	 than	 the	newly	 emerging	Ministry	 of	 Environment,	which	was	only	nominally	upgraded	in	2008.	Most	of	the	work	involves	the	end-of-pipe	solution	such	as	environmental	policy	monitoring,	inspection,	supervision	and	verification.	v	Anonymous	 interview	 at	 the	 Energy	 Bureau,	 Jiangsu	 Provincial	 Development	 and	 Reform	Commission	(JS/09/2013)	and	interview	with	Jingcheng	Jin,	Director	of	Power	and	New	Energy	Department,	Zhejiang	Provincial	Development	and	Reform	Commission	(ZJ/02/2013)	vi	Interview	with	Andy	Chong	(JS/11/2013).	vii	Interview	with	Hongfei	Huang	(ZJ/12/2013).	viii	Interview	with	Yangang	Jia	(JS/10/2013).	ix	Anonymous	interview	in	Jiangsu	(JS/05/2103).	x	Interview	with	Jinwei	Zhu	(JS/04/2013)	xi	Interview	with	Jingcheng	Jin	(ZJ/02/2013).	xii	Interview	 with	 Professor	 Pei-hong	 Wang,	 board	 member	 of	 China	 Energy	 Research	 Society	(JS/02/2013).	xiii	Anonymous	interview	(JS/15/2013)	xiv	Anonymous	interview	(JS/15/2013).	xv	This	 policy	 document	 has	 revised	 and	 re-introduced	 in	 2015,	 and	 certain	 purposes	 for	 the	development	 fund	 have	 been	 removed,	 such	 as	 encouraging	 the	 research	 and	 ‘local	 content’	equipment	production.	xvi	China’s	wind	 resources	 are	mainly	 concentrated	 in	 the	 Northern	 regions	 and	 coastal	 areas;	these	areas	accounted	for	77	per	cent	of	the	above-mentioned	land-based	wind	energy	resources	(Liu	 2013).	 As	 Lewis	 (2011)	 observes,	 we	 have	 seldom	 seen	 wind	 resources	 on	 such	 a	 scale	developed	elsewhere	in	the	world.	xvii	Anonymous	interview	(JS/15/2013).	xviii	Interview	with	Ruilin	Xu	(JS/03/2013).	xixAccording	to	the	policy,	the	subsidy	is	a	standard	tariff	on	17	Yuan/W	for	the	building	project.	For	the	combined-mounted	photovoltaic	building-integration	projects	on	the	roof	and	walls,	the	subsidy	 standard	 tariff	 is	 13	 Yuan/W.	 Regarding	 PV	 tariffs,	 an	 anonymous	 policy	 maker	 at	Jiangsu	Energy	Bureau	indicated,	‘Now	at	Jiangsu	Province,	the	price	of	1	kilowatt	of	electricity	is	
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																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													1	Yuan.	The	cost	is	actually	4.355	Yuan,	and	the	rest	is	supported	by	the	state’s	subsidies.	State	funds	supports	enterprises,	this	is	why	our	renewable	electricity	price	is	lower	than	the	prices	in	European	countries.’(Anonymous	09/JS/2013).	xx	Interview	with	Yangang	Jia	(JS/10/2013).	xxi	Interview	with	Pei-hong	Wang	(JS/02/2013).	xxii	For	 example,	 the	development	of	nuclear	power	 in	China	began	early	 in	 the	1950s,	 and	 the	industry	 was	 dominated	 by	 three	 state-owned	 enterprises:	 China	 Guangdong	 Nuclear	 Power	Group	Co.,	Ltd.,	China	National	Nuclear	Corporation	and	China	Power	Investment	Corporation.	As	with	the	renewables	sector,	the	state	was	reluctant	to	open	up	the	sector	to	foreign	actors,	and	the	 principle	 of	 endogenous	 technology	 development	 was	 stressed	 as	 well	 as	 the	 attempt	 to	facilitate	technology	transfer	from	American	and	French	producers	(OECD	2012:	116).	However,	unlike	 the	 renewables	 sector,	 there	 was	 no	 centralised	 government	 apparatus	 developing	coherent	policies	for	the	sector	(Xu	2010:	68)	and	no	set	of	unified	standards	for	nuclear	safety	and	 industrial	 technology	 and	 the	 local	 industry	 still	 remains	 relatively	 backward	 (Liu	 2013:	106).	In	addition,	within	the	field	of	climate	technology,	there	is	a	recognition	that	the	process	of	catch-up	is	facing	difficulties.	As	the	Ministry	of	Technology’s	Twelve	Five	Year	Special	Guidelines	of	Electric	Vehicle	Technology	Development,	published	in	2012,	put	it:	At	 present,	 China’s	 electric	 vehicle	 development	 has	 entered	 a	 critical	 period.	We	 are	facing	 major	 development	 opportunities,	 and	 we	 are	 also	 facing	 serious	 challenges.	There	are	still	many	problems	to	be	solved	in	the	development	of	electric	vehicles;	for	example,	our	core	technology	is	not	competitive,	corporation	is	reluctant	to	invest,	and	the	 potential	 of	 government	 coordinative	 and	 planning	 capacity	 has	 not	 been	 fully	released	(Ministry	of	Technology	2012).	
